25X1



## National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

26 October 1982

State Dept. review completed

25X1

Top Secret

CPAS NIDC 82-250C 26 October 1982




| A            | oproved For Rele | ase 2008/09 | /10 : CIA-F | DP84T00301 | R000500010186-7 | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|--------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-----------------|---------------|
|              |                  |             |             |            | Top Secret      | 25/1          |
|              |                  |             |             |            | •               |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
| Con          | tents            |             |             |            |                 |               |
| <b>CO.1.</b> |                  |             |             |            |                 | 25 <b>X</b> 6 |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            | _               |               |
|              | ussa: Hard       | Currency Po | osition Ir  | mproves    | 1               | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              | Libya-China:     | Qadhafi'    | s Visit .   |            | 5               | •             |
|              | - 4              |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 | 25/(1         |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              | ,                |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 | OEV4          |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 | 25X1          |
|              |                  |             |             |            |                 |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            | Top Secret      |               |
|              |                  |             |             |            | TOD DECLEC      |               |

Approved For Release 2008/09/10 : CIA-RDP84T00301R000500010186-7

25X1

| Approved For Release 2008/09/10 : CIA-RDP84T00301R000500010186-7   |   |              |  |  |  |
|--|---|--------------|--|--|--|
| Тор  | Secret  |              |  |  |  |
|  |   |              |  |  |  |
|  |   |              |  |  |  |
|  |   |              |  |  |  |
|  |   |              |  |  |  |
| USSR: Hard Currency Position Improves  |   |              |  |  |  |
| Strenuous efforts by the USSR since late 1981 to hard currency balance of payments are succeeding, but cost to the Soviet economy and to some economies in Econom | at substantial  | 1            |  |  |  |
| By increasing oil exports and closely maports, Moscow reduced its hard currency tradeduring the first six months of this year to \$ compared with the \$6 billion deficit during thalf of 1981. Soviet data indicate that hard export earnings increased by \$4 billion over rable period in 1981, with more than half the ing from a 50-percent increase in the amount Accelerated sales of machinery and equipment added \$900 million.  | deficit 2.2 billion, he first currency the compa- rise result- of oil sold. | 1            |  |  |  |
| The volume of grain imports climbed by 4 tons in the first half of 1982, compared with half of 1981, but the grain bill was unchange of lower grain prices. Western trade data su the volume of chemical and steel imports—oth pipe—dropped, and there was almost no increa ports of capital goods.  | the first<br>d because<br>ggest that<br>er than                             | 1            |  |  |  |
| Comment: Moscow has paid a substantial improvement in its hard currency trade positic crease in oil exports for hard currency was a by cutting back exports to Eastern Europe and domestic allocations to industry, transportate electric power. The USSR did not buy some of materials and equipment it needed to ease industries and stimulate productivity.   | on. The in- chieved only by reducing ion, and the Western ustrial           | 5 <b>X</b> 1 |  |  |  |
| The USSR will have difficulty maintainin improvement in its hard currency trade positi next few years. It will have to maintain oil the West at the recent high level, but oil pr stayed about the same for two years, and requoil continue to rise in the USSR and in Eastern   | on during the exports to oduction has irements for rn Europe.               |              |  |  |  |
|  | 2   | 5X1          |  |  |  |
|  | 25X1  | 1            |  |  |  |
| 1 Top  | Secret  |              |  |  |  |
|  | <br>25X   | <b>(</b> 1   |  |  |  |



25X1

Top Secret

LIBYA-CHINA: Qadhafi's Visit

Libyan leader Qadhafi arrived in Beijing yesterday on his first visit to China. Relations between Libya and China were established in 1978. The Secretary of Libya's General People's Committee--the equivalent of prime minister--visited China in August.

25X1

Comment: Qadhafi evidently wants to demonstrate his "nonalignment" to the Third World and to counterbalance his isolation in Arab and African circles. He probably also intends to use the visit as a sign of his unhappiness about the USSR's lack of effective support for the Palestinians in recent months. Chinese officials are likely to believe that too close a relationship with Libya would jeopardize their ties with moderate Arab states. At the same time, they may hope to encourage Tripoli to turn away from Moscow by broadening bilateral relations.

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

Approved For Release 2008/09/10 : CIA-RDP84T00301R000500010186-7 **Top Secret** 

**Top Secret**